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CONSIDERATIONS FOR BRINGING A CLASS
ACTION SUIT IN OKLAHOMA STATE COURTS
I. INTRODUCTION
The following analysis of the Oklahoma class action statute1 is
intended to highlight various pitfalls to be avoided and to point out
salient factors to be considered in bringing a class action suit in Okla-
homa state courts. Materials available on class action suits are substan-
tial and no attempt is made in this comment to present an in-depth
discussion of class action suits in general. The class action suit has been
used with increasing regularity. While consumer-oriented and environ-
mental groups have found it to be valuable, it has been most frequently
used in Oklahoma in connection with taxpayer and property suits.
II. LEGiSLATrvE HISToRY
The purpose of section 233 is to prevent a multiplicity of suits and
to enable many persons to have their rights determined without their
actual apperance in court as litigants.2  Under the doctrine of "virtual
representation," class actions may be brought by one or a few and be
binding on many. The doctrine is based on sense of justice, necessity
and paramount convenience to all parties.3
Section 233 originates from a Kansas statute.4 The language of
both statutes was taken from the phraseology of Justice Story in Com-
mentaries on Equity Pleadings,5 where he discussed class action statutes
1. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 233 (1971) provides:
When the question is one of common or general interest of many persons, or
when the parties are very numerous, and it may be impracticable to bring
them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all.
Related statutes include OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 230 (1971) (mandatory joinder of parties)
and OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 232 (1971) (permissive representatives).
2. State ex reL Tharel v. Board of Comm'rs, 188 Okla. 184, 107 P.2d 542 (1940).
3. Id. at -, 107 P.2d at 553.
4. GEN. STAT. KAN. 1889, para. 4115.
5. J. STORY, COMM1ENTARIES ON EQr1TY PLEADINGS (10th rev. ed. 1892).
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and summarized the development of class actions in English equity
courts."
Justice Story's language in the Commentaries was first used by the
New York legislature in 1849. The language soon spread to other
states. 7  The Kansas and Oklahoma statutes reflect the intent of the
respective legislatures to provide for this equitable tool first listed in the
New York statutes. The language has been attacked, however, as
wholly inadequate and giving no information at all.8
IH. ANALYSIS OF OKLAHOMA CLASS ACTION STATUTE
A. REQUIREMBNTS IN GENERAL
The major Oklahoma decision interpreting section 233 is State ex
rel. Tharel v. Board of Commissioners.9 The state, for the plaintiff
class, brought suit against the defendant class of taxpayers and Board of
County Commissioners to enjoin the Board from proceeding under a
statute authorizing reassessment of property on which taxes were delin-
quent.
The Tharel court, in concluding that a class action was applicable,
listed, albeit somewhat obliquely, the elements necessary to satisfy sec-
tion 233. First, a community of interest must exist between the mem-
bers of the plaintiff class. (This is the common and general question.)
Second, the plaintiff class must number several hundreds. (Thus, the
parties must be very numerous, or it must be impracticable to bring
them all before the court.) Third, the plaintiff class members must
have a direct financial interest in the issues presented. (The plaintiff
class members must have standing to sue.) Finally, the defendants
must be representatives of their class.' 0
An analysis of Oklahoma and Kansas decisions, prior and subse-
quent to Tharel, indicate that a section 233 class action is not available
when a community of interest, impracticable number of parties or
standing to sue is absent. However, the decisions reveal that judicial
concern has focused primarily on the community of interest-common
and general question criteria. Little attention has been paid to the other
elements, specifically the question of representation.
6. See Simeone, Procedural Problems of Class Suits, 60 MIcH. L. REv. 905, 909
(1962).
7. Homburger, State Class Actions and The Federal Rule, 71 COL. L. REV. 609,
612-13 (1971).
8. Sunderland, The Federal Rule, 45 W. VA. L.Q. 5 (1938).
9. 188 Okla. 184, 107 P.2d 542 (1940).
10. Id. at 195, 107 P.2d at 553-54.
[VoI. 11:429
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B. SPEciFic ELEMENTS
1. COMMON AND GENERAL QUESTIONS:
A COMMUNITY OF INTEREST
To determine and establish that a common and general question
exists is perhaps the most difficult of the requirements to satisfy. It is
clear from Tharel that when there is a "community of interest," there is
a common and general question. In defining a "community of inter-
est," the court relied on a three part test provided in Skinner v.
Mitchell:
[Mlhe community of interest lies in the legal questions in-
volved, the similarity of the situation of the several taxpayers,
and in the fact that the character of the relief sought would be
applicable to all .... 12
The Skinner test separates the legal question from the "similarity of
the situation" from which one can conclude that the latter may be
factual. However, the courts have not made the distinction between law
and fact. In practice, the two have been combined and discussed as a
common question of law and fact.
May one element of the Skinner test be absent and a community of
interest still exist? An analysis of the decisions reveals that the absence
of one defeats the attempt to establish a community of interest. And,
failure to establish a community of interest results in no common and
general question. (For ease of discussion the cases will be separated
into three categories: taxpayer suits, property suits and other suits.)
Taxpayer Suits
Taxpayer suits brought pursuant to class action statute have most
often failed for lack of application to all parties. It is clear that class
action suits cannot be maintained when the action challenges a valid tax
as improperly or illegally applied to several plaintiffs. A case illustra-
tive of this principle is Stiles v. City of Guthrie.13 The court in Stiles
stressed that the common interest of the plaintiffs "'must be in the
subject-matter of the action, and not merely in the legal questions
involved in their separate causes of action. . .. 1'"14 The success of
one plaintiff who challenged the improper collection of the tax would
11. 108 Kan. 861, 197 P. 569 (1921).
12. Id. at -, 197 P. at 571.
13. 3 Okla. 26, 41 P. 383 (1895).
14, Id. at 40-41, 41 P. at 388.
1976]
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not have established that the application of the tax to another plaintiff
was improper. Therefore, the relief demanded was not applicable to
nor binding on all parties. Had each plaintiff had an interest in the
same taxed property, the result would have been different. Stiles in-
volved a suit to enjoin the collection of a valid tax for construction of a
road and bridge. However, the principle illustrated in Stiles is applica-
ble to other suits involving a valid tax collected for other purposes.'
While taxpayers may not bring a class action as a taxpayer class
challenging the illegal collection of a valid tax, taxpayers' class action
suits may be maintained when the tax is challenged as illegal.1 The
legal question and subject matter of the action is the constitutionality of
the tax. If one taxpayer establishes the tax as unconstitutional, then its
unconstitutionality is established for all taxpayers. Relief applies to all
even though each taxpayer owns separate property.
Property Suits
Plaintiffs in property class actions have had substantially better
success in bringing a class action suit. There is apparently less difficul-
ty in establishing the interest in the subject matter through the same
factual situation and legal questions, as well as in applying the relief to
all parties.
It is important to note that in property class action suits it is not
necessary that all plaintiffs jointly own the property in question for the
action to lie. Class action suits have been allowed when various parcels
of real property have been injured by a common nuisance.1 7  In addi-
tion, class actions have been maintained to establish ownership to
land."8
15. Felten Track Line v. State Bd. of Tax Appeals, 183 Kan. 287, 327 P.2d 836(1958) (action by several motor carriers to recover taxes paid under protest to State
Commission of Revenue and Taxation); Hudson v. Comm'rs of Atchison County, 12
Kan. 115 (1873) (action by corporation shareholders of building and savings association
to enjoin the collection of a tax on certain shares of stock owned by plaintiffs sepa-
rately); Wyandotte & Kansas-City Bridge Co. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 10 Kan.
247 (1872) (action to enjoin a tax to pay interest on bonds for construction of
a bridge); Davenport v. Snyder, 185 Okla. 160, 90 P.2d 653 (1939) (action to enjoin
a tax resale).
16. State ex reL Tharel v. Board of Comm'rs, 188 Okla. 184, 107 P.2d 542 (1940);
Skinner v. Mitchell, 108 Kan. 861, 197 P. 569 (1921).
17. Atchison St. Ry. v. Nave, 38 Kan. 744, 17 P. 587 (1888) (obstruction of en-
trance way to plaintiffs' property by construction of street railroad); Palmer v. Waddell,
22 Kan. 248 (1879) (water overflow caused by obstruction of a natural water course).
18. Fink v. Umsheid, 40 Kan. 271, 19 P. 623 (1888) (action by members of Catho-
lic Church at Rock Creek, Kansas to have certain land placed in trust for the church).
[Vol. 11:429
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The traditional property class action suit in Oklahoma involves an
action by owners of several and distinct lands for some injury to the land
or to some aspect of land ownership. Typically, the action has been
brought by owners of land in an oil and gas unit organization for failure
of the unit and its operators to obtain the highest sale or market price
for oil produced in the unit.19
Other Suits
Very few class action suits have been brought pursuant to section
233 other than property and taxpayer suits. It is questionable whether
class actions are allowed in tort actions. In one case a class action was
not maintained because of the nonapplication of relief to all parties in
the class.20 Section 233 has been used successfully by employees of a
common defendant21 to recover overtime wages denied them in violation
of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.1
2. AN IMPRACTICABLE NUMBER OF PARTIES
There has been no test developed by the courts as to what consti-
tutes an impracticable number of parties. Nor, in the opinion of this
writer, should there be. The determination of this issue is properly
within the discretion of the trial court.
No maximum limit to the plaintiff or defendant class has been
established. In taxpayer suits, plaintiff-classes have represented those
similarly situated within a county, city or town.23 Outside of taxpayer
19. Harding v. Cameron, 220 F. Supp. 466 (W.D. Okla. 1963); West Edmond
Hunton Lime Unit v. Young, 325 P.2d 1047 (Okla. 1958); Young v. West Edmond Lime
Unit, 275 P.2d 304 (Okla. 1954); appeal dismissed, 349 U.S. 909 (1955). See also
Bloch v. Sun Oil Corp., 335 F. Supp. 190 (W.D. Okla. 1941) (alleged sale of extracted
by-products from the production of the wells on plaintiffs' land); Hall Jones Oil Corp.
v. Claro, 459 P.2d 858 (Okla. 1969) (suit by several mineral lessors to recover for
breach of implied covenant by defendants who jointly operated an offset well).
20. Holland Oil & Gas Co. v. Holland, 144 Kan. 863, 220 P. 1044 (1923) (suit
by several plaintiffs who each claimed that a common defendant made the same false
representations to them; the court held that no single plaintiff was affected by the cause
of action of any other plaintiff nor interested in the relief demanded by any other plain-
tiff).
21. Hargrove v. Mid-Continent Oil Corp., 36 F. Supp. 233 (E.D. Okla. 1941).
22. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974).
23. Oklahoma: Morton v. Oklahoma City, 477 P.2d 58 (Okla. 1970); State ex rel.
Tharel v. Board of Comm'rs, 188 Okla. 184, 107 P.2d 542 (1940); Davenport v. Snyder,
185 Okla. 160, 90 P.2d 653 (1939); Stiles v. City of Guthrie, 3 Okla. 26, 41 P. 383
(1895); Kansas: Skinner v. Mitchell, 108 Kan. 861, 197 P. 569 (1921); Nixon v.
School District No. 92, 32 Kan. 510, 4 P. 1017 (1884); Center Township v. Hunt, 16
Kan. 430 (1876); Hudson v. Comm'rs of Atchison County, 12 Kan. 115 (1873); Wyan-
dotte & Kansas City Bridge Co. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 10 Kan. 247 (1872).
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suits, an action by an unspecified number of members of a church
congregation was allowed.24
No minimum limit has been set by either Kansas or Oklahoma
courts. Two earlier Kansas decisions allowed three plaintiffs to consti-
tute the class25 without discussing the reasons for allowing so small a
number to make up the class. It is unclear whether the Kansas Su-
preme Court was establishing a judicial policy allowing class actions by
such a small number. We are without the benefit of recent decisions
interpreting the statute as Kansas adopted the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in 1964. In Oklahoma class actions by as few as fifteen 21
and eleven2 7 plaintiffs have been allowed. However, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court declared that it did not look with favor upon a class
action with such a small class.28
3. STANDING
The Tharel court required that each member of the plaintiff class
have a direct financial interest in the issues presented to the court.2D As
thus stated, the court was pointing to a basic requirement for maintain-
ing an individual action as well as a class action: the plaintiff must have
standing. To represent others who are similarly situated for alleged
wrongs they have suffered, the plaintiff must first show that he has
suffered a redressable wrong. He must prove that some legally protect-
ed right has been violated or that he has suffered some injury for which
the law provides him redress. Thus, the plaintiff must establish his own
standing to sue before he may attempt to sue for others.
In several cases a class action was denied where the plaintiff failed
to maintain his right to sue. 0 Although the United States Supreme
Court has expanded the concept of what constitutes a redressable injury,
the plaintiff must still allege that he has suffered injury before he can
pursue his action.31
24. Fink v. Umsheid, 40 Kan. 271, 19 P. 623 (1888).
25. Cases cited note 17 supra.
26. Harding v. Cameron, 220 F. Supp. 466 (W.D. Okla. 1963).
27. Hall Jones Oil Corp. v. Claro, 459 P.2d 858 (Okla. 1969).
28. Id. at 862. The court found no prejudicial error, however, and allowed the suit.
29. 188 Okla. at 195, 107 P.2d at 554.
30. Center Township v. Hunt, 16 Kan. 430 (1876); Craft v. Comm'rs of Jackson
County, 5 Kan. 313 (1870).
31. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
fVol. 11:429
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4. REPRESENTATION
Oklahoma and Kansas courts have seldom dealt with the issue of
representation. 32  Tharel required that a defendant must represent his
class but did not mention the plaintiff as a representative. What
constitutes proper representation under section 233? What qualifica-
tions must a plaintiff have to represent a class? How is the composition
of the alleged class to be determined? What effect does the alleged
representation have on the ability of unnamed members of the class to
bring suit on the same issues at some future date? Are unnamed and
unidentified members of the class bound by the decision? If so, how do
the courts identify those members? Must members, who can be reason-
ably identified, be given individual notice of the action? Do individual
members of the class have an opportunity to opt out or to challenge the
plaintiff as representative of the class? The language of section 233 and
the judicial interpretations of the statute do not clearly answer these
questions. At best, the answers are merely suggested by the cases.
The proper plaintiff should be one who represents the interests of
the class without each class member being physically present in court.
Does it necessarily follow that unnamed and unidentified members of
the olass are bound by the decision? If the purpose of section 233 is to
avoid a multiciplicity of suits binding on many, 3 then the answer would
appear to be in the affirmative. However, Oklahoma courts have never
clearly decided this issue. In addition, it is unclear as to what "virtual
representation" means. Tharet mentions but does not define the doe-
trine.3 4 Also unclear is the effect of Eisen v. Carlisle & Jaquelin 5 on
actions brought pursuant to section 233. Eisen is a recent United States
Supreme Court case on the question of individual notice in olass actions.
Various factors strongly suggest that Eisen has a limited effect on a
section 233 suit because unnamed, unidentified class members are not
bound by a decision in a section 233 action.
32. In one of the few Kansas cases found on representation, the plaintiff failed to
establish his right to represent others in a quiet title action involving one hundred and
forty-four sections of land. Taylor v. Focks Drilling & Mfg. Co., 144 Kan. 626, 62 P.2d
903 (1936). The only Oklahoma decision found by this writer discussing representation
is Tharel, where the Oklahoma Supreme Court mentioned the "virtual representation"
doctrine. 188 Okla. at 194, 107 P.2d at 553.
33. See text accompanying notes 2-8 supra.
34. Apparently this doctrine is "'a means of enabling many persons to have their
rights determined without their actual appearance in court as litigants."' 188 Okla. at
194, 107 P.2d at 553. As discussed, virtual representation is synonymous with class ac-
tion. The definition is of no aid in resolving any questions concerning representation.
35. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
1976]
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Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin
The United States Supreme Court reached a decision on Eisen after
eight years of litigation.3 6  Plaintiff brought a class action for himself
and other odd-lot traders against brokerage firms and stock exchanges
for alleged violations of antitrust and security laws. The Supreme
Court held that individual notice to identifiable class members was
mandatory, that notice requirements could not be tailor-made to fit the
financial situation of the particular plaintiff, and that the plaintiff was
required by Rule 2337 to bear the cost of notice to members of the
class.3 8  Whether Eisen was merely an interpretation of Rule 23 affect-
ing only class actions brought in federal court or a constitutional man-
date of due process reaching all class actions is not clearly defined by the
opinion. However, the Court's language suggests that due process
considerations require notice to individual members of the class who can
be identified through reasonable efforts when the judgment would be
binding on these members. Whether the notice requirements of Eisen
apply to section 233 depends on the binding effect on absent members
of the class of a judgment reached under an action brought pursuant to
the Oklahoma statute.
Eisen was held to be a subsection (b)(3) class action 0 subject to
36. The litigation history of Eisen is as follows: 41 F.R.D. 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)
(district court determined that a class action was not maintainable); 370 F.2d 119 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967) (Eisen I) (the order dismissing the class ac-
tion held appealable); 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1967) (Eisen 11) (court of appeals re-
versed district court, retained jurisdiction and remanded case); 50 F.R.D. 471 (S.D.N.Y.
1970) (district court determined more information was needed); 52 F.R.D. 253
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) (district court determined that the action was maintainable as a class
action); 54 F.R.D. 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (district court ordered defendant to bear 90
percent of the cost of notice); 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973) (Eisen MI) (court of ap-
peals reversed the rulings allowing prosecution of the case as class action).
37. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
38. 417 U.S. at 177-79.
39. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3) provides:
An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of
subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only indi-
vidual members, and that a class action is superior to other available
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The
matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of the members
of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of sepa-
rate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the
controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C)
the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the
claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encoun-
tered in the management of a class action.
436
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the notice requirements defined in subsection (c)(2).40 Prior to the
1966 Amendments, Rule 23 provided for a "true," "hybrid," and
"spurious" class action. The spurious class action was merely consid-
ered a permissive joinder device and the judgment in such cases bound
only the original parties of record and those who intervened and became
parties to the action.4 ' Under the amended rule the tri-part division of
class actions listed above was abolished and the judgment is now bind-
ing on all members of the class who do not opt out.42
Subsection (b)(3), which has language similar to the previously
known spurious class action, reaches those cases where "a class action
would achieve economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote
uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacrific-
ing procedural fairness or bringing about undesirable results."43 Under
this subsection the class may be less unified in their interests than the
other subsections. Rule 23(b)(3) requires only that there be questions
of law or fact which are common to the class, that these questions
predominate over the questions affecting individual members and that
the class action be the superior means of adjudicating the controversy. 44
From the Eisen decision it is clear that, in subsection (b)(3) class
actions, the express language and intent of Rule 23(c)(2) requires
individual notice to be provided to those members of the class who are
reasonably identifiable.45  This notice requirement is included in the
Rule for several reasons. Class members do not receive notice by
service of process. Also, subsection (b)(3) class actions give members
40. Subdivision (c) (2) provides in full:
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b) (3), the court
shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the
circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified
through reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A) the
court will exclude him from the class if he so requests by a specified date;(B) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all members who do
not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not request exclusion
may, if he desires, enter an appearance through his counsel.
41. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 41 F.R.D. 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Proposed Rules
of Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 69, 98 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Rules];
Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39, 43
(1968); Comment, Notice, Preliminary Hearing, and Manageability in Federal Class
Actions, 11 HOUSTON L. Rav. 121 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Federal Class Actions].
42. Proposed Rules, supra note 41, at 99; Federal Class Actions, supra note 41, at
121; Note, Federal Jurisdiction and Practice: The Notice Requirement in Class Ac-
tions-The Eisen Controversy, 27 OKLA. L. Rnv. 70, 74 (1974).
43. Proposed Rules, supra note 41, at 102-03.
44. Note, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin-Fluid Recovery, Mini-hearings and Notice
in Class Actions, 54 B.U.L. Rnv. 111 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Notice in Class Ac-
tions].
45. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 175 (1974).
1976]
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the privilege of requesting exclusion from the judgment." However,
the most important reason, as previously mentioned, is that members
who fail to opt out are bound by the decisions. The Supreme Court,
in relying on the Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 23 to support its
conclusion, stated:
The Advisory Committee described (c) (2) as "not merely
discretionary" and added that the "mandatory notice pursuant
to subdivision (c) (2) . . . is designed to fulfill require-
ments of due process to which the class action procedure is
of course subject."47
Eisen, therefore, is more than just an interpretation of Rule 23.
The decision rests on due process considerations. Individual notice is
required when the members of the class who are not original parties or
intervenors are to be bound unless affirmatively acting to remove them-
selves from the judgment.
The Effect of Eisen and Due Process Considerations on Section 233
Actions
Because Eisen is based on due process considerations, state class
actions which are similar in form or effect to subsection (b)(3)
federal class actions also require individual notices to reasonably identi-
fiable members of the class who would be bound by the judgment.
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due
process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is
notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to
apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and
afford them an opportunity to present their objections."
Prior to the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 and the Eisen decision in
1974, class actions as well as other actions were governed by due
process standards established by the Supreme Court in a line of cases
illustrated by two decisions, Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co." and Hansberry v. Lee.° In Mullane, a judicial settlement case
which would have been binding on the beneficiaries of a common trust
fund, the Supreme Court held that notice and an opportunity to be
heard were fundamental requisites of the constitutional guarantee of
procedural due process, and that publication notice could not satisfy due
46. Notice in Class Actions, supra note 44, at 137.
47. 417 U.S. at 173.
48. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
49. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
50. 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
[Vol. 11:429
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process where the names and addresses of the beneficiaries were
known.51 Notice must be reasonably calculated to inform all interested
parties in the action.52 Hansberry implied that the essential requisite of
due process is the adequate representation of the class.53 Eisen rein-
forced Mullane's rejection of notice by publication where the name and
address of the person affected is available" and merged Hansberry's
adequate representation doctrine with notice as a due process and Rule
23 requirement. 55
The requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) bear resemblance to those
specified in section 233.56 Therefore, one could conclude that Eisen
requires that any suit brought under section 233 must satisfy individual
notice requirements by notifying reasonably identifiable members of the
class. However, there is a notable distinction between the circumstances
in Eisen and any action brought pursuant to the Oklahoma statute. As
noted above, an Eisen-type class action is binding on the members of the
class who do not affirmatively opt out. Conversely, under section 233,
it is not clear whether a judgment would bind those members of the
class not mentioned as original parties or as intervenors. However,
several factors suggest that unnamed, unidenfiied class members will not
be bound by a section 233 action.
As previously mentioned, 57 the class action was developed to avoid
the strict requirements of joinder of parties. Many states appended
their class action provisions to the compulsory joinder rules. Others,
including Oklahoma, have separated the class action provisions from
compulsory joinder and considered it a matter of permissible joinder.58
The Oklahoma Supreme Court in Tharel discussed "virtual representa-
tion" as a device to allow, rather than require, many persons to have
their rights litigated without their actual appearance in court.5 9 The ef-
fect of this permissible representation and joinder is to remove those
members not actually present or named in the action from the judg-
ment. In addition, the wording of section 233 is similar to the spurious
class action of Rule 23 prior to the 1966 amendments. One could argue
51. 339 U.S. at 313-15.
52. Id. at 314.
53. 311 U.S. at 42; Notice in Class Actions, supra note 44, at 140.
54. 417 U.S. at 174-75.
55. Id. at 176-77.
56. Id. at 173.
57. See notes 2-8 supra and accompanying text.
58. Homburger, State Class Actions and the Federal Rule, 71 COL. L. Rnv. 609,
615 (1971).
59. 188 Okla. at 194, 107 P.2d at 553.
1976]
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by analogy that the judgment under section 233 binds only original
parties as in the spurious class action. Furthermore, a Kansas decision
suggests that a clAs action suit involving a large number of unnamed
plaintiffs is not binding on those parties who have not participated in the
actual trial, or who have not accepted the representation of the actual
plaintiffs.60 It is suggested that the acceptance of representation occurs
when actual consent is given or plaintiff accepts the benefits of the
judgment. It is not clear whether knowledge of the suit and failure to
object to it is sufficient to constitute acceptance of representation.
It is submitted, therefore, that Eisen, although decided on due
process grounds, will not affect an action under section 233 unless that
section is held to be comparable to a Rule 23(b)(3) class action. This
means that an action brought pursuant to section 233 must be consid-
ered binding on the unnamed members of the class, rather than just as
a device for permissible joinder, before individual notice of all reasona-
bly identifiable members will be required. It is further submitted that a
section 233 class action will not bind unnamed, unidentified class mem-
bers for the reasons discussed previously. 1 If an Oklahoma court
decided that the class action was binding on all class members but that
an Eisen-type notice was not required, at a minimum, the due
process considerations of Mullane and Hansberry would have to be met.
Even under such circumstances, in this author's opinion, section 233
would be subject to constitutional attacks.
IV. CONCLUSION
Section 233 is ambiguous in application and enforcement. The
language has been attacked as wholly inadequate and giving no infor-
mation at all. 62 The Kansas statute, upon which section 233 is based,
has been abrogated and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 has been
adopted in its stead. It is submitted that section 233 is not adequate to
fulfill the purpose for which it was promulgated. The statute, in the
opinion of this writer, is woefully archaic and ineffective to deal with the
complexity of issues involved in modem class actions.
The conclusion that section 233 is inadequate to fulfill its purport-
ed purpose is based on the following factors: the purpose of section 233
is to prevent a multiplicitly of suits and enable a few persons to sue for
60. Alber v. Kansas City, 138 Kan. 184, 25 P.2d 364 (1936).
61. See text accompanying notes 57-60 supra.
62. Note 8 supra.
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and to bind many persons. To bind many persons not parties to the
action, due process considerations must be met. Due process requires
individual notice to those members of the class who are reasonably
identifiable and adequate notice under the circumstances to the other
members. Due process also requires some procedure whereby class
members can remove themselves from the class or at least challenge
those who seek to represent the class. No such procedure exists under
section 233. In addition, section 233 has been removed from the com-
pulsory joinder rules and has been considered a matter of permissible
joinder. The result of this combination of factors is ambiguity and con-
fusion.
This writer suggests that Oklahoma adopt Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 as amended in 1966. The confusion and ambiguity
which has arisen from the language of section 233 would be curtailed. A
substantial body of federal case law interpreting Rule 23 is available to
fill a void currently existing in Oklahoma in relation to the questions
raised above. Rule 23 is not without problems, but its origin and de-
sign is more modem than section 233. Therefore, it has a better chance
of providing a workable framework for a solution to the complicated
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